India China Relations: History, Challenges, and Modern Outlook

Introduction

India and China are two of the world’s most influential civilizations, each with thousands of years of history, culture, and knowledge. Their relationship has evolved through phases of friendship, cultural exchange, rivalry, and conflict. Today, as both nations rise as major global powers, their interactions significantly influence Asian geopolitics and global stability.

Understanding India China relations requires a comprehensive look at their ancient ties, colonial experiences, post-independence diplomacy, border disputes, and modern challenges.

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India China Relations (The History)

Ancient Civilizational Links

The relationship between India and China dates back over 2,000 years. Both civilizations connected through the Silk Route, which facilitated not just the movement of goods like silk, cotton, and spices but also the exchange of religious and philosophical ideas.

A crucial link was Buddhism, which spread from India to China. Pilgrims and scholars from China frequently travelled to India to study original texts.

• Faxian (405–411 CE): During the Gupta period, he studied Indian Buddhist practices and visited key centres like Nalanda.
• Xuanzang (7th century CE): Under Harshavardhana, he spent years in India, collecting manuscripts and teaching. His detailed accounts provide valuable historical insight.
• Yi Jing (I Tsing): Another traveler who documented Indian Buddhist traditions and carried knowledge back to China.

These exchanges enriched both cultures and laid the foundation for centuries of intellectual and spiritual dialogue.

Bodhidharma and Cultural Legacy

Another cross-cultural connection is linked to Bodhidharma, a South Indian Buddhist monk (associated with the Pallava kingdom, 5th–6th century CE). He travelled to China and became the 28th patriarch of Mahayana Buddhism and the first patriarch of Chan (Zen) Buddhism.

Chinese traditions also regard him as the founder of Shaolin martial arts, which later evolved into Kung Fu. This remarkable legacy highlights how Indian philosophical and spiritual traditions influenced Chinese culture far beyond religion.

Medieval Exchanges

During the medieval period, diplomatic ties continued. In the 14th century, Ibn Battuta, a Moroccan traveller, came to India during Muhammad bin Tughlaq’s reign. In 1342 CE, he was sent on a diplomatic mission to China under the Yuan dynasty. His travelogue Rihla illustrates the enduring curiosity and contact between India and China during this period.

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Colonial Era

The colonial period dramatically reshaped India China relations. With India under British control, the relationship became entangled in imperial politics.

• Border Issues: The boundaries between British India and China’s frontiers in Tibet and Xinjiang became disputed. The seeds of modern territorial disputes in Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh were sown during this period.
• Trade Impact: The British East India Company’s involvement in the tea and opium trade had far-reaching effects. Britain’s export of opium from India to China led to the Opium Wars (1839–1842 and 1856–1860). These conflicts humiliated China, weakened its sovereignty, and left deep scars in Sino-foreign relations.

Thus, by the end of the colonial era, India-China ties were marked less by cultural exchange and more by political and economic complications.

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Post-Independence (1947 onwards)

Early Cooperation and Hope

After independence, India was quick to recognize the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. This step was seen as a progressive gesture of solidarity among newly emerging Asian nations.

The spirit of friendship was encapsulated in the slogan “Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai” (Indians and Chinese are brothers). The signing of the Panchsheel Agreement (1954) emphasized principles of:

• Mutual respect for sovereignty
• Non-aggression
• Non-interference
• Equality and mutual benefit
• Peaceful coexistence

This raised hopes for a lasting partnership between the two Asian neighbours.

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Border Disputes and War

India China Relations on Border: An Overview

The boundary question between India and China is rooted in the unfinished legacy of the British and the Manchu empires. Much of the frontier lies in the high Himalayas, sparsely populated and poorly defined. After independence, India took the position that the McMahon Line settled the matter, while China consolidated its hold over Tibet and constructed a road across Aksai Chin, which India also claimed.

The 1962 War, Tibet’s Annexation by PRC, and its Aftermath

China’s annexation of Tibet in 1950 altered the strategic balance along India’s northern frontier.
In July 1954, PM Nehru sent letter to the Chinese authority for border revision. However, Chinese premiere Zhou-En-Lai returned it along with a map claiming errors in Indian map and included 1,20,000 km of Indian territory as Chinese position. After Lhasa Rebellion in 1959, Dalai Lama was given reception in India as political asylum which enraged China.

In 1959, Beijing, under Mao Zadong, proposed recognition of India’s claim in the east (Arunachal Pradesh) in return for Aksai Chin to China and accept a Line-of-Actual-Control as the border while both side forces recede by 20 km off the line , but New Delhi rejected the idea as it follows the Johnson Line placed Aksai Chin within the princely state of Jammu & Kashmir, and this became the basis of India’s claim after independence. China, on the other hand, follows the Macartney–MacDonald Line (1899), which placed Aksai Chin within Xinjiang. Which Further emphasized by then Chinese premiere- Zhou-EN-Lai in his Delhi visit in 1960.

MacMahon Line is a 890 km border of Arunanchal Pradesh (proposed in the 1860s by British surveyor W.H. Johnson), starting from Bhutan till the Isu Razi pass near Myanmar, a de-facto border between Tibet (China) and India. It was signed between the British India and the Kingdom of Tibet in 1914.

Johnson Line is India’s accepted boundary between China and East of Ladakh over Aksai Chin, proposed in 1868 by the British-India, between Princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, under Gulab Singh, and China’s Xinjiang province.

This hardened positions and culminated in the war of 1962, where India suffered setbacks and lost control of Aksai Chin. Although China withdrew from parts of the eastern sector, it retained its gains in the west (Aksai Chin). The following years saw occasional clashes, such as those at Nathu La and Cho La, and both sides increased patrols in contested zones.

The turning point in India China relations came with the 1962 Sino-Indian War. China attacked across two sectors:

• Aksai Chin: Controlled by China but claimed by India.
• NEFA (now Arunachal Pradesh): Where Chinese troops advanced deeply before declaring a ceasefire.

India was defeated, and the war left deep psychological and strategic wounds. It destroyed the trust built in the 1950s and shaped decades of suspicion.

Diplomatic Engagement and Agreements

By the late 1970s, there was a shift towards talks with the visit of then foreign minister Sri Atal Bihari Vajpayee, under Janta party government, to Beijing, wherein then Chinese president Deng Xiaoping again proposed the 1960 proposal. The 1967 Sikkim skirmish and 1986-87 Sumdorong Chu conflict, which India relataliated well, caused further strains in India China relations. India’s fairly incorporation of Sikkim in 1975 was criticized by China. In 1983, China further claimed the Tawang district of Arunanchal Pradesh, which claimed it as part of South Tibet called Zangnan, in the border negotiation naming it LAC plus.

It was PM Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to Beijing in 1988 helped normalize ties. Then president Deng Xiaoping asked him to forget the unpleasant past and resume trade and resolve border dispute based on Mutual Understand and Mutual Accomodation (MUMA) and both countries formed Joint Action Group (JWC) on border issues.

Then In 1993 on sixth JWG meet, under Prime Minister Narasimha Rao, the two sides signed the Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement, committing to respect the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and avoid escalation. Several rounds of discussions followed, which reduced forces and artillery along the border but efforts to mutually define the LAC proved unsuccessful.

Political Frameworks and Continuing Disputes

Prime Minister Vajpayee’s 2003 visit to China led to the creation of the Special Representatives (SR) mechanism to pursue a final settlement. The 2005 agreement on Political Parameters and Guiding Principles underlined the need to respect settled populations and each other’s concerns. Yet, disputes persisted, especially over Tawang, which China continued to claim.

Further Developments

The 2010s saw attempts at confidence building, including the Wuhan (2018) and Mamallapuram (2019) summits. However, confrontations such as Doklam in 2017 and the violent clash in Galwan in 2020 revealed the fragility of the peace process.

Subsequent Clashes

• 1967 Nathu La and Cho La clashes: India successfully resisted Chinese incursions in Sikkim.
• 1987 Sumdorong Chu standoff: Tensions resurfaced in Arunachal Pradesh in the Tawang region, countered by India with Operation Falcon.
• 2020 Galwan Valley clash: The deadliest encounter in decades led to casualties on both sides, highlighting the fragility of peace along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

These recurring border issues remain the most sensitive and unresolved aspect of India-China ties.

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Modern Relations

Economic Interdependence

Despite tensions, bilateral trade has grown immensely in the last three decades. China is one of India’s largest trading partners. Key aspects include:

• India imports electronics, machinery, active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs), and chemicals.
• India exports raw materials, minerals, and agricultural products.

However, the trade deficit heavily favours China, raising concerns in India about economic dependence. India China net trade-value is USD 127 billion (2024-25) with trade deficit of USD 99 billion, with imports from China is about USD 113 billion and export of mere USD 14 billion approximately.

Multilateral Cooperation

India and China also engage in global platforms such as:

• BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) and BRICS+.
• Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)
• G20 and climate negotiations
• India and China have unusual support for each other againt WTO’s attempt to remove domestic subsidy on agricultural produce, called Agreement of Agriculture (AOA), to reduce distorted trade by introducing Amber Box Subsidy which alleged to have benefitted more to developed nations than developing and economies in transition like India, China and Brazil.

These forums allow dialogue despite bilateral tensions, as both countries recognize their global responsibilities.

Strategic Rivalries

Yet, cooperation is overshadowed by rivalry:

• China has been opposing India’s inclusion, despite other members’ support, in Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) which controls and prohibits the member states for selling of nuclear technology to non-member states fearing the dual use of nuclear technology (weaponisation) and works on consensus. China wants India signs Nuclear Proliferation Treaty(NPT) and Comprehensive Nuclear Ban Treaty (CNBT), which would prohibit India from further development of nuclear missiles and disarm India’s existing nuclear missiles, and both India and Pakistan have not signed both the treaties, before allowing it into NSG; or change rules to allow Pakistan as well in the group.
• However, India is consensual member of other three global control regimes which both China and Pakistan are not part of viz, Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)-that controls supply of missile technology beyond 300km range and 500kg payload; Australia Group– to destroy chemical weapons; and, Wassenaar Agreement– to regulate dual use of conventional weapon technology against chemical and biological weaponry.
• China’s ties with Pakistan: Particularly its support for the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) passing through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. India China relations have seen strains due to China’s vahement support to Pakistan, which calls the latter as “all weather ally”. China has been secretly supplying military technology to Pakistan viz-a-viz both not being member of MTCR.
• Border infrastructure race: Both nations rapidly develop roads, airstrips, and military infrastructure along disputed areas.
• Geopolitical competition: China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) contrasts with India’s vision of regional connectivity, creating competing spheres of influence in Asia.
• India considers BRI as transgression in India’s sovereignty as part of which passes through Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK) though CPEC against India’s will.
• To join BRI, India proposed that, first, the connectivity initiative must be based on Rule based order. Second, it must follow financial responsibility on projects to avoid debt trap of participating nations, and third, the proposal must respect sovereignty and integrity of other nations.
• India’s counter approach with International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) a multi-modal transportation route, which passes through Chabahar port of Iran, encompassing Gwadar port of CEPC in Balochistan district of Pakistan, connecting Russia at St. Peterburg via Ajerbaijan.
• Also, India’s proposal of India-Middle East Economic Corridor (IMEC) at G20-2023, New Delhi. Forming an alternative route to Europe via Middle East, bypassing the need of Suez canal.
• China’s String of Pearls to contain India from three sides- Gwadar port, Hambantota and Chittagong port.
• India’s response with Necklace of Diamonds connecting Strait of Hormuz, strait of Malacca, Bab-El-Mandeb via Indian Ocean Region.
• China’s building of dam over Tibet part of Brahmaputra, called Yurlung Tsangpo river. Estimated as world’s largest hydropower project at around USD 137-170 billion, with a design capacity to generate about 300 billion kilowatt-hours annually.
• It involves building dams and tunnels through rugged Himalayan terrain, notably drilling through the Namcha Barwa mountain/gorge and related stretches. Four-to-six tunnels of around 20 km each are mentioned in some reports. Which India concerns about its probable negative effect on downstream countries (India, Bangladesh) in terms of water flow, ecological balance, geology or disaster risk.
• India- Japan’s Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC): specially designed against China’s debt trap diplomacy in African region, through soft line of credits and development funds in Africa through Japan bank such as enhance connectivity (transport, maritime, road, rail), foster digital infrastructure, improve trade corridors, and promote people-to-people partnerships.
• India China relations further constrained through the progress of QUAD, a strategic alliance among India, US, Japan and Australia to observe and make strategic positions thought military and policies on China’s influence in the Indian ocean.
• India’s security development through Projects SAGAR and MAHASAGAR with Mauritius and Other Indian Ocean African littoral states; Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS)– a maritime defence agreement of 24 littoral states in Indian Ocean Regional Association (IORA); Indo-Pacific Ocean Initiative (IPOA)– with ASEAN and 8 dialog partners.
• India has been a proponent of Global south which China is also part of. However, in the Voice of Global South summits in 2023-2024 which took place virtually and hosted by India, both China and Pakistan were not invited to participate.

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India China Relations in 2025

Resumption of People-to-People Links

In 2025, India and China took steps to restore normal exchanges by resuming the Kailash-Mansarovar Yatra, reinstating tourist visas for Chinese nationals, and moving towards the revival of direct passenger flights. Discussions also included reopening border trade routes such as Lipulekh, Nathu La, and Shipki La to strengthen local economic ties.

Border Dialogue, SR Talks, and Expert Mechanism

The 19th round of Special Representatives’ (SR) talks was held in 2024, focusing on stabilising the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and ensuring disengagement in remaining friction points. In 2025, another round of SR talks complemented the decision to set up an Expert Group under the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on Border Affairs. The Expert Group is tasked with exploring early solutions for boundary delimitation. While these steps mark intent, fundamental differences over the LAC remain unresolved.

Prime Minister Modi’s Visit to China for SCO Summit

Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Tianjin for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Summit, marking his first China trip in seven years. During talks with President Xi Jinping, both leaders stressed that India and China should view each other as partners, not rivals. Xi emphasized that the “dragon and elephant must move together” for regional stability. It also condemned the unilateral tariff imposition of 50%, against the WTO rule, by the USA on India and favoured for Rule-Based-Global Order on international trade and tariff.

At the SCO Summit, the joint declaration condemned the Pahalgam terror attack, reflecting a diplomatic success for India. Earlier, at the Qingdao Defence Ministers’ Meeting, India had refused to endorse a declaration that downplayed cross-border terrorism. Defence Minister Rajnath Singh reiterated India’s stance of zero tolerance and accountability for terror sponsors.

China signalled willingness to increase imports from India in sectors like software, pharmaceuticals, and biotech, while India pressed for a more reciprocal business environment for Chinese investment.

Despite these positive signals, the border dispute continues to cast a shadow. The SR talks and the new Expert Group represent progress, but resolving territorial claims remains a long-term challenge.

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The Way Forward

For India China relations to move toward stability, both nations must work on:

1. Border Resolution: A permanent settlement or at least a workable mechanism to prevent violent clashes.
2. Balanced Trade: Efforts to reduce India’s trade deficit with China through diversification and self-reliance in key sectors.
3. Regional Cooperation: Collaborating on climate change, counter-terrorism, and sustainable development, where both nations share common interests.
4. People-to-People Ties: Promoting cultural, educational, and tourism exchanges to revive the historical bonds of trust.

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Conclusion

The evolution of India China relations is a story of cultural bridges, colonial legacies, post-independence optimism, and modern-day rivalries. From Faxian and Xuanzang’s pilgrimages to the Silk Route, from Bodhidharma’s Zen teachings to the trauma of the 1962 war, the relationship has swung between friendship and conflict.

Today, India and China stand as two of the world’s largest economies and most powerful nations. Their future ties will not only determine the stability of Asia but also shape the global order. A balanced approach of dialogue, mutual respect, and cooperation is essential to ensure that the 21st century becomes a century of partnership rather than confrontation.

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